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Executive Summary
In the wake of the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the landscape of immigration law
and policy in the United States changed dramatically as the government scrambled to create
counterterrorism programs to respond to potential national security threats. Many of these
policies relied on discriminatory profiling of individuals from countries with predominantly Muslim
populations and were based on the false assumption that people of a particular religion or
nationality have a greater propensity for committing terrorism-related crimes. One of the most
prominent of these programs is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) or
“special registration” that was initiated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2002 and inherited by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.
NSEERS served as a tool that allowed the government to systematically target Arabs, Middle
Easterners, Muslims, and South Asians from designated countries for enhanced scrutiny. The most
controversial piece of NSEERS required nonimmigrant males who were 16 years of age and older
from 25 specific countries to register at local immigration offices for fingerprinting, photographs, and
lengthy, invasive interrogations. Generally, the term “nonimmigrants” refers to individuals who are
seeking admission to the United States temporarily for purposes of education, employment, pleasure,
etc. Other than North Korea, each of the listed countries has predominantly Muslim populations.5
Many individuals were deported through secret proceedings that took place without due process of
law. The specifics of NSEERS reveal it to be a clear example of discriminatory and arbitrary racial
profiling. More than 80,000 men underwent call-in registration and thousands were subjected to
interrogations and detention, wasting taxpayer dollars through this counterproductive response to
September 11th which has not resulted in a single known terrorism-related conviction.
From its inception, NSEERS elicited a strong negative response from Arab, Middle Eastern,
Muslim, and South Asian communities in the United States. For a decade, advocacy organizations
including Rights Working Group,
politicians

9

termination.

6

immigration lawyers and the private bar,

7

policy analysts, 8 and

have spoken out against the discriminatory and ineffective program and called for its full
10

4

Impact on Families and Communities
To this day, many families are separated geographically because a male family member was
deported to his country of origin after attempting to comply with NSEERS, even if he did not have any
relatives or contacts in that country.

11

In April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

announced that the 25 NSEERS countries would be delisted and nonimmigrants from those countries
would no longer need to comply with the program. Although DHS framed this policy shift as having
“ended” NSEERS, the delisting of the specific countries through the April 2011 Rule did not
eliminate the program’s underlying infrastructure. Individuals continue to face harsh immigration
consequences resulting from the program, including deportation and the denial of immigration
benefits for which they are otherwise eligible.
Continued Lack of Transparency and Misuse of Data
Clear, publicly available information on NSEERS procedures and goals was unavailable from its
inception and the program continues to lack transparency. Even today, the agencies involved in the
program share little data or other information regarding its effectiveness. The issue of transparency
is closely related to concerns about the misuse of data.
While NSEERS has been suspended, the data collected through the program is still available
to DHS and potentially other government agencies. It is unclear how the data collected through the
registration process has been and potentially is still being used. Much of the data gathered is very
private and sensitive information, such as that related to individuals’ private financial matters. Those
who registered have to live with the constant fear that this data could be used against them in the
future.
NSEERS is Easy to Resurrect
Subsequent to the April 2011 delisting, DHS admitted that the NSEERS program was not
dismantled because the government wished to keep the regulations intact. This position is untenable
as it ignores the numerous calls for full termination from advocates, members of Congress, and DHS’
own Office of Inspector General. Moreover, this lets-keep-it-in-our-back-pocket approach to
addressing NSEERS suggests that the Obama Administration condones and intends to continue
policies that rely on discriminatory racial profiling.

5

Failure to Meet Program Objectives
NSEERS was ineffective and failed as a counterterrorism tool. There appears to be no
evidence that NSEERS has led to the identification of anyone suspected of involvement in
terrorism-related crimes. In February 2012, DHS’s independent watchdog, the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), concluded that the NSEERS database was unreliable and found that the requirements
of the program proved to be burdensome upon registrants, as they imposed lengthy questioning and
multiple data checks. The OIG also characterized the program as an inefficient use of government
resources which prevented DHS agents from conducting more targeted homeland security
efforts.

12

DHS has estimated that the program cost American taxpayers more than $10 million

annually, and the OIG found that leaving the regulatory structure of the program intact provides no
discernible public benefit. The OIG recommended fully terminating NSEERS and stated there is “no
longer a value to the program.”
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Postscript
Following the final draft of this report in April of 2012, DHS released a new memorandum
about individuals impacted by NSEERS, granting limited relief to individuals who failed to comply with
NSEERS and who can demonstrate that their noncompliance was not willful. This memo is binding
on all DHS personnel and requires each component of DHS to implement guidance within 60 days of
the memorandum’s issuance and related training.
Conclusion
NSEERS is an ineffective, discriminatory program which relies on racial profiling. It continues
to devastate individuals, their families and communities and its lasting impacts are not sufficiently
corrected by the Obama Administration’s recent policy shifts. Rights Working Group hopes that this
report and its recommendations result in the full termination of the NSEERS program, redress for all
individuals impacted by the program, and the discontinuation of the use of data collected through it.
Recommendations
Dismantle the Regulatory Framework of NSEERS: NSEERS has failed as a counterterrorism
policy, and national security needs can be addressed more effectively and efficiently through other
existing programs and/or through programs targeting individuals based on suspect behavior, rather
than through identity-based criteria such as race, religion, gender, or nationality.
6

Remove Residual NSEERS Penalties: DHS should, by regulation, remove the residual penalties
associated with NSEERS and apply such regulations retroactively. DHS should additionally set aside
immigration or criminal penalties against individuals who complied with, did not comply with, or are
otherwise affected by the NSEERS program. DHS should also exercise prosecutorial discretion
favorably in cases where an individual has positive equities but faces immigration consequences
because he or she was targeted by NSEERS.
Information Collected through NSEERS Should No Longer be Used for Any Purposes: DHS
should discontinue the use of data collected through NSEERS.
Increase Oversight and Transparency: NSEERS should be fully audited by DHS through the
Office of Inspector General as well as by the Government Accountability Office to determine the
program’s effectiveness and to examine the continuing impact of NSEERS on individuals and the
potential misuse of data. DHS should make statistics available on the number of individuals who
were identified through the program and subsequently convicted of terrorism-related offenses. DHS
should also provide complete statistics about the total number of individuals who registered with the
program, as well as details about the enforcement actions that were taken against them.
Support the End Racial Profiling Act: To show his commitment to ending racial profiling,
President Obama should make a clear statement in support of the End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA)
of 2011. This bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress in 2011.

14

If ERPA were passed, it

“would prohibit racial profiling by law enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels on the basis
of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, and gender.”

15

Fix the DOJ Racial Profiling Guidance: To effectively combat racial profiling, the 2003
Department of Justice Guidance on the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies must be
reformed to cover profiling based on religion and national origin; remove the large loopholes that
allow for profiling in the name of national security and border security; cover law enforcement
surveillance activities; apply anywhere federal agents act in partnership with state or local law
enforcement agents and to any agency that receives federal funds; and make the guidance
enforceable.

7

8

Introduction

I

n the national trauma caused by 9/11, civil liberties came face to face with
national security. Arab-Americans, American Muslims, and South-Asian
Americans faced national origin and religious profiling. To take just one
example, the Special Registration program targeted Arab and Muslim visitors,
requiring them to promptly register with the INS or face deportation. At the time,
I called for the program to be terminated because there were serious doubts
it would help combat terrorism. Terrorism experts have since concluded that
Special Registration wasted homeland security resources and alienated Arab
Americans and American Muslims. More than 80,000 people registered, and
more than 13,000 were placed in deportation proceedings. Even today, many
innocent Arabs and Muslims face deportation because of Special Registration.
How many terrorists were identified by Special Registration? None. 16
--- Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois)
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11), the landscape of immigration law and
policy in the United States changed dramatically as the government scrambled to create
counterterrorism programs to respond to potential national security threats. Many of these policies
relied on discriminatory profiling of individuals from predominantly Arab and Muslim countries based
on the false assumption that people of a particular gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality have
a greater propensity for committing terrorism-related crimes.

17

One of the most prominent of these

programs is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) or “special registration”
that was initiated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2002 and later inherited by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. Since its inception, NSEERS elicited a strong negative response
from Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian (AMEMSA) communities in the United States.
Advocacy organizations including Rights Working Group,
policy analysts,
program.

20

and politicians

21

18

immigration lawyers and the private bar,

have spoken out against the discriminatory and ineffective

22

On June 5, 2002, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the creation of NSEERS,
9

23

19

marketing it as a counterterrorism tool.

24

According to DHS, NSEERS was originally designed to

[R]ecord the arrival, stay, and departure of certain individuals from countries
chosen based on an analysis of possible national security threats. The NSEERS
registration required approximately 30 minutes in secondary inspection, per person,
per arrival; and NSEERS registrants were also required to register upon departure
at one of the 118 designated ports of departure, limiting travel flexibility. 25
NSEERS targeted visitors from predominantly Arab and Muslim countries.
process required certain individuals

27

26

The registration

to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interrogated about

their background and biographical information (including details about their families, birthdays and
birth places, financial information, etc.) at a port of entry/exit or at local immigration office.

28

Particularly in the beginning, the program’s regulations and guidelines were communicated and
distributed ineffectively, and at times even inaccurately, making it exceedingly difficult for individuals
to comply.

29

Although NSEERS has undergone several changes since its inception in 2002, it

remains a discriminatory program which relies on racial profiling. NSEERS continues to devastate
individuals, their families, and communities, and its impacts have not been sufficiently corrected
through the Obama Administration’s policy shifts.
This report adopts the definition of racial profiling contained in the End Racial Profiling Act of
2011 (ERPA),

30

where it is defined as “[t]he practice of a law enforcement agent or agency relying,

to any degree, on race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, or religion—
(i) in selecting which individual to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory activities or
(ii) in deciding upon the scope and substance of law enforcement activity following the initial
investigatory activity.” 31
On April 28, 2011, DHS announced the “end” of NSEERS through a notice in the Federal
Register (April 2011 Rule).

32

Specifically, the April 2011 Rule stated “that it is no longer necessary

to subject nationals from these countries to special registration procedures, and this notice deletes
all currently designated countries from NSEERS compliance.”

33

A press release on the DHS website

stated:

10

Since NSEERS was created, DHS has implemented several automated systems
that capture arrival and/or exit information, making the manual entry of this data
via the NSEERS registration process redundant, inefficient and unnecessary. The
improved and expanded DHS and Department of State systems capture the same
information for visitors, regardless of nationality. As a result of these advances
and input from community groups and advocacy organizations, we are pleased to
announce that the Department is officially ending the NSEERS registration process.
This step will streamline the collection of data for individuals entering or exiting the
United States, regardless of nationality. 34
Although DHS framed this policy shift as having “ended” NSEERS, the delisting of the specific
countries through the April 2011 Rule did not eliminate the program’s underlying infrastructure, and
we do not regard this as a true end to the program.

35

This policy shift meant only that from April

28, 2011 onwards, individuals who would have been targeted previously by the program were no
longer obligated to register. Notably, the April 2011 Rule failed to address the ongoing negative
impacts felt by individuals who had previously registered, failed to register, or improperly registered.
While a variety of advocacy organizations opposed to the program applauded DHS for the
“long-overdue”

36

suspension of NSEERS,

37

they also pointed out “that the program is dormant, not

abolished, and there’s still been no accountability.”

38

Many of these advocacy groups contend that

DHS, through the April 2011 rule, did not address residual effects of the program, as “there remains
much damage to rectify from NSEERS’ discriminatory immigration enforcement.”

39

As a candidate, President Barack Obama’s campaign released a “Blueprint for Change” which
stated that, if elected, “Obama and Biden will ban racial profiling . . .”.

40

Attorney General Eric

Holder has also stated that ending racial profiling was a “priority” for the Obama Administration and
that profiling was “simply not good law enforcement.”

41

DHS maintains that NSEERS did not profile

based on religion because every eligible male from an NSEERS country was required to
register regardless of religious affiliation. We maintain that NSEERS did profile based on religion
because the program disproportionately impacted Muslims. A more detailed discussion of this
issue appears in the Racial Profiling section of this report. By keeping the structures of a program
(NSEERS) that targeted people based on their gender, religion, age, and nationality in place, the
federal government can be seen as condoning and promoting similar discriminatory policies at the
state and local level. A prominent example is that of the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD)
11

surveillance of Muslim communities and individuals. A series of Pulitzer Prize winning Associated
Press articles revealed that the NYPD has subjected Muslims to surveillance. Undercover officers
infiltrated minority neighborhoods and hundreds of mosques and Muslim student groups, without
any reliable indication of suspect behavior. Many of the NYPD operations were built with help from
the CIA, which is prohibited from domestic spying but which was critical to the transformation
of the NYPD’s intelligence unit after 9/11.

42

The fact that DHS has kept the NSEERS regulatory

framework intact belies the Obama Administration’s statements of opposition to racial profiling and
indicates the Administration’s support of similar practices at the state and local level.
This report builds on a 2009 white paper prepared by the Center for Immigrants’ Rights at
Penn State’s Dickinson School of Law on behalf of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee.

43

The purpose of this report is to analyze the impact of NSEERS in its current form

and make recommendations for meaningful reform. The groundwork for this analysis is laid out in
Section 1: The NSEERS Framework, which describes the legal foundation and the development of
NSEERS since its inception. The ensuing policy analysis in Section 2: Policy Impact: NSEERS is

Still in Effect identifies the current issues with the program. In particular, this section looks at the
effects NSEERS has on those individuals who continue to be negatively impacted by the program.
Based on this examination, the Policy Recommendations section provides recommendations for
government policymakers. The report also aims to educate individuals, policymakers, and
advocates about NSEERS.
The methodology of this report consists of two pillars. First, it is based on the analysis of
statutes, regulations, policies, reports, and statistics relating to NSEERS. Second, the analysis is
complemented by interviews with policymakers involved in the creation and oversight of NSEERS,
analysts who have studied the program, and immigration attorneys and advocacy groups who have
represented impacted individuals.

12

.

Profile
D enyse S abagh ,
H ead of immigration L aw G roup , D uane M orris LLC

I was involved with NSEERS from the beginning. Right from the start, when they published the first set
of countries, it was very chaotic. The regulation was published in the Federal Register. It was not
disseminated to the community very effectively. Many people in the community and those who would
be affected by the regulation did not know about it.
I represented many individuals subject to NSEERS since its inception in 2002. The program was sloppy
in its original set-up due to the rapid execution, no additional funding for implementation, no additional
staff and a general lack of clear guidance. Initially, the regulations of the program were unclear to all
parties involved (affected immigrants, immigration lawyers, and even government staff) and resulted in
mistakes and misinformation. For many affected individuals it was difficult to register because of long
lines in front of registration offices, people being turned away, unclear, contradicting, or missing
information, and procedural mistakes made by the staff of the government agencies.
For a lot of people, it affected their lives adversely. I represented a student from Johns Hopkins. He
was from Pakistan. He had gone in to register. He had applied and had been admitted to Johns
Hopkins for his Master’s Degree. Johns Hopkins knew his situation. However, somewhere along the
way, Hopkins failed to advise him properly about the timing of filing his application to change status
from H-1B to a student. He ended up in jail and in deportation proceedings. He also was the
President of the student body. They and the professors provided tremendous support. Thirty-plus
people came to his deportation hearing. The Judge was impressed. We conducted an all-out campaign
to get him reinstated. We were finally able to get him reinstated so that he could stay in the U.S. The
fallout from NSEERS for him and many others created unnecessary problems and psychological and
emotional scars.
I also observed that as a result of NSEERS, the Muslim communities felt very much under siege. It
seemed that the legal standard changed and they were guilty until they were proven innocent. They
were placed in a state of constant anxiety and fear. NSEERS sure looked like racial profiling. It
targeted individuals based on nationality, age, gender, and religion. If the government wanted to
create an effective counterterrorism tool, it could have developed a list of criteria that would be related
to the actual focus of identifying terrorists, rather than profiling against whole classes of people based
on their nationality.

44
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NSEERS Legal Framework
NSEERS was badly-conceived, poorly executed, arbitrarily administered, and it had
disastrous results.
— James Zogby, President and Founder of the Arab American Institute
The framework of NSEERS is linked to Section 110 of the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996,

45

which mandated an automated entry-exit data

system that would “collect a record of every alien departing the United States and match the records
of departure with the record of the alien’s arrival in the United States.”

46

According to DHS, the

initial purpose of the entry-exit data system was to address the extensive problem the United States
was facing with nonimmigrants

47

overstaying their visas.

48

In response to the September 11 attacks, former President George W. Bush signed into law
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001
of 2002 (EBSVERA).

50

49

and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act

Under Section 414 of the USA PATRIOT Act,

51

Congress called for the

integration of the entry and exit data system in Section 110 of the IIRAIRA amongst airports,
seaports, and land border ports of entry. The section further emphasized the utilization of biometric
technology and the development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of entry.

52

As a means of implementing these changes, Congress placed the responsibility of developing
an entry and exit registration system on the Department of Justice (DOJ). NSEERS was created
under the guidance of Kris W. Kobach,

53

a DOJ advisor at that time. While NSEERS was showcased

as a component of the entry and exit system, the program also found its statutory foundation in
section 263 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

54

Under this section,

The Attorney General is authorized to prescribe special regulations and forms for the
registration and fingerprinting of (1) alien crewmen, (2) holders of border-crossing
identification cards, (3) aliens confined in institutions within the US, (4) aliens under order of
removal, (5) aliens who are or have been on criminal prohibition or criminal parole within the
United States, and (6) aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted to the US for permanent
residence. 55
14

The NSEERS program had three main components. The first component of NSEERS was
known as “port-of-entry” registration and consisted of fingerprinting and photographing certain
nonimmigrants or visitors at all ports of entry, such as border crossings, seaports, and airports.
Those initially required to register included: visitors from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria, and
select foreign visitors determined to present an elevated national security risk.

56

Under NSEERS,

fingerprint scans were to be run on all entering nonimmigrants against a database of thousands of
known terrorists.

57

All individuals registered under NSEERS were also required to re-register after

thirty days if initially registered at a port-of-entry and annually if they were remaining in the United
States longer than one year.

58

The NSEERS program was expanded to include a “call-in” feature that required certain male
foreign visitors who were 16 years of age and older from specified countries and already present in
the United States to register at designated immigration offices. The registration requirement was
first applied to nonimmigrant males from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. These individuals were
required to register with INS between November 15, 2002

59

and December 16, 2002. The second

group required to register were from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North
Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Their registration occurred
between December 2, 2002 and January 10, 2003.

60

The third group included individuals from

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who were to register between January 13, 2003 and March 21, 2003.

61

The last group of visitors required to register were from Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, and Kuwait
and were to register between February 24, 2003 and April 25, 2003.

62

The government’s execution

of the “call in” registration was sharply criticized. Requiring males of a certain age from
predominantly Muslim countries to register constituted profiling based on gender, age, religion,

63

and nationality. Moreover, inadequate notice and misinformation prevented many individuals who
would have complied from doing so. The federal government relied principally on notices in the
Federal Register to inform the public of registration requirements and, like the majority of the
American population, most individuals subject to NSEERS were not familiar with the Federal Register
or the requirements contained therein.

64

Finally, the NSEERS program established a system of exit controls, which required
individuals subject to NSEERS to register each time they departed from the United States.

65

15

Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft believed a critical aspect of the NSEERS program was to arrest
those individuals who attempted to escape the registration requirements or to stay in the country
beyond their permitted time.

66

Failure to comply with NSEERS could result in significant penalties.

67

Any nonimmigrant

subject to special registration who failed without good cause to be examined by an inspecting officer
at the time of his departure and to have his departure recorded by the inspecting officer is presumed
to be inadmissible upon future entry under but not limited to 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) as an “alien who seeks to enter the United States to engage in unlawful
activity.”

68

If one failed to comply with NSEERS after admission into the United States, he is

considered to have failed to maintain status under section 237(a)(1)(C)(i) of the INA.

However,

69

an exception to this rule applies if the individual is able to demonstrate that the failure to register was
“reasonably excusable or not willful.”

70

A related penalty kicked in for a number of individuals who

were in the process of applying for an immigration benefit or relief, who were told during this process
that they must comply with NSEERS through “late” registration. In these situations, the agency’s
adjudication of “willful” was often controversial to the extent that officers capriciously stamped the
passports of late registrants as “willful” even in cases where they were unaware of the program,
limited in English, and/or of high school age at the time they were required to register.

71

Another potential consequence for failure to comply with NSEERS is the initiation of criminal
proceedings. Pursuant to the statute and related notices issued by the government, anyone required
to register who “willfully fails or refuses” to do so “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not to exceed $1000 or be imprisoned, not more than six months, or
both.”

72

In December 2003, DHS amended NSEERS by suspending the thirty-day and annual
re-registration requirements, among other changes.

73

In place of the previous requirement, the

new rule allowed DHS, as a matter of discretion, to notify individual nonimmigrants subject to
NSEERS to appear for one or more additional continuing registration interviews to determine whether
the individual was complying with the conditions of his or her visa status and admission.

74

The 2003

rule left the regulatory framework of NSEERS, related penalties, and entry and exit registration
requirements intact.
16

DHS subsequently issued a handful of memos discussing how immigration cases involving
NSEERS should be handled. One memorandum issued by former ICE Principal Legal Advisor William
Howard in October of 2005 addressed the use of prosecutorial discretion and its relation to NSEERS
(Howard Memo).

75

Prosecutorial discretion is law enforcement’s authority to decide whether or not

to enforce particular laws against a party.

76

The Howard Memo urges ICE attorneys to use

prosecutorial discretion before or in lieu of issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA) for immigration action

77

in certain sympathetic circumstances in which an individual has failed to register with NSEERS.
Specifically, the Howard Memo states:
When an alien subject to NSEERS registration failed to timely register but is otherwise in
status and has no criminal record, he should not be placed in proceedings if he has a
reasonable excuse for his failure. Reasonably excusable failure to register includes the
alien’s hospitalization, admission into a nursing home or extended care facility (where
mobility is severely limited); or where the alien
is simply unaware of the registration
78
requirements.
Interestingly, the Howard Memo did not
include “compliance with NSEERS” as a positive
factor in considering whether to exercise
prosecutorial discretion favorably. Reverend Seth
Kaper-Dale of the Reformed Church, profiled later in
this report, has criticized the absence of such
language in the Howard Memo and lamented that
several Indonesian men in his community complied
with NSEERS but were nonetheless placed in removal
proceedings. After months of advocacy with the local
ICE office, Kaper-Dale was able to move ICE to grant
orders of supervision (a form of prosecutorial
discretion) for about eighty-three Indonesian

Photo Courtesy of Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale

immigrants, nine of whom were incarcerated by ICE but were later
released as a result of the arrangement.
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On April 28, 2011, DHS announced the delisting of all 25 specified countries from the
program.
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The Department stated that, as a result of improved intelligence programs and better

methods of tracking immigrant visa overstays, NSEERS is no longer needed to protect national
security. In addition, DHS stated that it will “seek to identify individuals and actions that pose specific
threats, rather than focusing on more general designations of groups of individuals, such as country
of origin.”
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This language supports the idea that the profiling of individuals based on gender, age,

religion, or nationality is wrong and ineffective and that NSEERS represents a failed policy. This April
2011 rule thus temporarily suspends the program requirements for nationals and citizens from these
25 countries. Key to note, however, is that the regulations that gave rise to the NSEERS program and
the penalties faced by the vast majority of noncitizens who did not comply or improperly complied
with the program remained in place.
On June 17, 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton issued
two significant memos on the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters.

82

The memo

called on ICE attorneys and employees to refrain from pursuing noncitizens with close family,
educational, military, or other ties in the United States, and instead to spend the agency’s limited
resources on persons who pose a serious threat to public safety or national security. The Morton
Memo elucidates 19 factors that ICE should consider in deciding whether prosecutorial discretion
should be favorably exercised.
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The Morton memo is the most comprehensive memo on

prosecutorial discretion since the creation of DHS. Yet, as of this writing, it has, at best, been
implemented inconsistently.
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Moreover, the Morton Memo lacks any details about how individuals

impacted by NSEERS should be treated.
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) also issued a memo related to
prosecutorial discretion on November 7, 2011. This memo established new guidelines for referring
cases and issuing Notices to Appear (NTAs) in a manner that promotes the effective use of DOJ and
DHS resources. It states that USCIS will refer all cases in which immigration benefits are denied
based on NSEERS violations to ICE for possible NTA issuance.
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This memo reveals that

immigration benefits can still be denied because of NSEERS and that those whose cases were
previously denied could continue to face negative consequences. In addition, referring cases to ICE
for possible NTA issuance means that individuals are still subject to removal from the United States
because of NSEERS. This referral policy contradicts the agency’s stated desire to “end” NSEERS.
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In February 2012, DHS’s independent watchdog, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG),
released a report entitled, “Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security.”
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In this

report, the OIG concludes that the NSEERS database was unreliable and finds that the requirements
of the program proved to be burdensome upon registrants, as they imposed lengthy questioning and
multiple data checks. The OIG also characterizes the program as an inefficient use of government
resources that prevented DHS agents from conducting more targeted homeland security efforts.

88

DHS has estimated that the program cost American taxpayers more than $10 million annually, and
the OIG finds that leaving the regulatory structure of the program intact provides no discernible
public benefit. Most importantly, the OIG recommends fully terminating NSEERS and states there is
“no longer a value to the program.”
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Policy Impact: NSEERS is Still in Effect
Of course it could come back because the infrastructure is still there and they [the
government] still do not get the fact that they screwed it up. They did not get it right and
they wasted resources and did not accomplish anything. They will do it again and they will
do it again in exactly the same way because they still do not get it. 90
— James Zogby, President and Founder of the Arab American Institute
Despite DHS’ indefinite suspension of NSEERS under the April 2011 Rule, no relief or policy
has been suggested that addresses foreign nationals and citizens who were placed in removal
proceedings after complying with NSEERS, those who had never registered because they were afraid
to register or were unaware of the program, among others.
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This section also highlights a number

of policy concerns with NSEERS including the program’s lack of transparency, misuse of the data
collected through NSEERS, the negative impact of preserving the underlying regulatory structure,
and the program’s ineffectiveness as a counterterrorism tool.
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Profile
H adi S yed Z aidi ,
I ndividual affected

by

NSEERS

Hadi Syed Zaidi is a Pakistani citizen who came to the United States at the age of 4. After being an
honors student in high school, he attended West Los Angeles Community College with the hope of
ultimately being able to transfer to a four-year university and enroll in a degree program in industrial
design or applied mathematics.
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His parents are both green card holders. Having registered under

NSEERS when he was 16, he was taken into custody by ICE in December of 2011, after the
purported “end” of NSEERS as announced in April of that year. He was detained because he
overstayed his visa and consequently faced deportation to Pakistan. Hadi was eventually released
and granted a temporary stay of removal in January of 2012. Despite this temporary stay, he can still
be taken into custody and must check in with immigration officials on a regular basis.
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Racial Profiling
Racial profiling undermines the rule of law and strikes at the core of our nation’s
94
commitment to equal protection for all.
— Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois)

e
Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has seen an increase in racial profiling practices and policies
at the federal, state, and local level, particularly the targeting of individuals of Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim,
and South Asian descent or those perceived to be members of those groups.
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This increase is tied to

counter-terrorism measures such as NSEERS implemented by the federal government which permitted and
even encouraged authorities to target these communities.
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As mentioned previously in this report, the call-in

portion of NSEERS targeted male visitors of certain ages from 25 specified countries, 24 of which have
predominantly Muslim populations. The program was discriminatory, arbitrary and failed to meet its purported
goals. Government officials have argued that NSEERS did not constitute profiling in part because it was
intended to expand to all countries, but this did not occur, as the NSEERS list was never expanded past the 25
20

countries—and individuals continue to be negatively affected by the program despite its suspension.
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Preeminent scholar on racial profiling, David Harris from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law stated in a
2012 congressional hearing on racial profiling that under NSEERS, “Muslims were targeted by using a
convenient proxy characteristic: national origin.”
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The agency maintained that NSEERS did not profile based

on religion because every eligible male from the NSEERS countries was required to register regardless of
religious affiliation. We disagree. In addition, while some members of the immigration agency have argued
that distinctions based on nationality and national origin in immigration are not only legitimate and consistent
with other immigration designs, the context matters. In her paper “Business as Usual: Immigration and the
National Security Exception,” Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia writes:
While profiling based on nationality or national origin may not be inherently wrong, there are at
least five reasons why it is offensive and in many cases no different from profiling based on race,
ethnicity or religion: 1) in practice many policies based on nationality disproportionately impact
particular religions and ethnicities; 2) this disproportionate impact creates the perception that a
particular policy is premised on anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiment; 3) most of the countries
identified by the government as harboring terrorists have been Arab or Muslim; 4) in practice
“nationality” based profiling is often conflated with “national origin” profiling; 5) profiling based
on country of birth has extended to naturalized United States [citizens] from particular countries,
leading to the presumption that citizens from particular places are somehow less reliable or loyal
in their allegiances to the United States.
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The Obama Administration’s refusal to fully terminate NSEERS suggests that the Administration condones,
supports, and intends to continue policies
that rely on discriminatory racial profiling,
such as those of the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) at the local level and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
at the federal level. With strong parallels to NSEERS, it was reported in 2011
that the NYPD has a secret squad, known
as the Demographics Unit, that spies on
Muslim businesses, mosques, and Muslim
students on campuses in New York City
and beyond. This squad wears

Photo Courtesy of Monami Maulik, Desis Rising Up and
Moving (DRUM)
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plainclothes and goes into Muslim neighborhoods to photograph and monitor mosques and locations where
Muslims congregate including restaurants, grocery stores, and travel agencies. The NYPD further monitors
Muslims who have changed their names to sound more traditionally American. At mosques, police record
license plates and take photos and videos of worshippers as they arrive for services. In 2004, New York City
adopted a law to prohibit racial profiling, which is defined as “the use of race, color, ethnicity, religion, or
national origin as the factor for initiating police action.” Surveillance such as that conducted by the NYPD
contradicts this law and clearly constitutes racial profiling, as did NSEERS.
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Policies that rely on

profiling persist at the national level as well, as evidenced, for example, by the FBI’s mapping program. Based
on crude stereotypes and assumptions about which groups commit crimes, the FBI is collecting racial and
ethnic information and “mapping” communities around the United States. Across the country, the FBI is
gathering reports on the so-called “suspicious activity” of innocent Americans and sharing it across federal,
state and local government agencies.
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Impact on Families and Communities
[NSEERS] is a family-breaking policy. 102
— Seth Kaper-Dale, Reverend at the Reformed Church in Highland Park, New Jersey

.

Profile
S eth K aper-D ale ,
R everend at the R eformed C hurch
P ark , N ew J ersey

in

H ighland

My wife and I became co-pastors of the Reformed Church in Highland Park in
September of 2001. Our first Sunday was two days before 9/11. The Reformed Church served as a
sanctuary for the Indonesian community to worship quietly on Sunday afternoons. Almost all of
individuals from this community fled religious persecution in Indonesia and arrived in the United
States on tourist visas. However, many had failed to file for asylum. After the start of the NSEERS
Program,
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I urged the Indonesian community to register and many took my advice and did register.

Melinda Basaran, a New Jersey immigration lawyer who worked with the Indonesians, believes that
a “good portion” of the community was deported due to compliance with NSEERS.
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In May 2006

at 5 a.m., at an apartment complex where many Indonesians lived, armed federal agents rounded
up 37 men with expired visas and deportation orders— terrifying their wives and children as they,
along with others, witnessed the men being taken away. Many believe that this raid was a result of
the information provided when registering with NSEERS. NSEERS did nothing more than instill fear
amongst these individuals, break family unity, and destroy the Indonesian community.
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Augus Alex Asa and his wife Grace arrived in the United States on tourist visas from Indonesia. They
complied with the NSEERS registration process in fear of being considered terrorist fugitives. I urged
the Indonesian community to register, but could have never predicted such detrimental
consequences. During the raid in May 2006, Mr. Asa, his wife, and daughter hid in the closet as the
immigration agents arrived at their door. For two weeks after, the family slept at the church. After
lengthy stays in immigration jails, 37 men from this Indonesian community were deported. Their
wives were forced to find work, financially support their families, and raise their children alone.
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On a Sunday night in 2006, I saw a lot of fathers playing with their kids in the sandbox. In the wee
hours of Monday morning they were picked up in that raid. Within thirty days, every single male was
sent away. We had people fearing everyday that another raid would happen. So for the next month,
we had about forty people sleeping in our church, eating at our kitchens.

107

NSEERS has had a wide range of negative social and economic consequences for families of
targeted individuals. NSEERS requirements often resulted in immigration detention or deportation,
tearing families apart. Many of these families feared not only loss or separation from a loved one,
but loss of their primary source of income and resulting homelessness. To this day, many families are
separated geographically because a male family member was deported to his country of origin after
attempting to comply with NSEERS, even if he did not have any relatives or contacts in that
country.
.
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Pofile
M irwan H arahap ,
I ndividual affected

by

NSEERS

I fled harassment and discrimination of Christians like myself in Indonesia in 1997 and arrived in the
United States on a tourist visa. I began working at a car service center in Metuchen, New Jersey.
After the start of NSEERS, I registered under the program and was questioned by DHS regarding
my overstay in the United States. In February 2009, I was deported to Indonesia and it destroyed
my family. I was forced to leave behind my wife and U.S. born child, and return to a country to live
without my loved ones. Complying with the registration procedures and abiding by NSEERS, my life
has been destroyed, whereas others who did not register under NSEERS continued to live and work
in the United States. Despite my valid working permit issued by DHS and my attorney’s demand for
my release back to my family in Metuchen, ICE has refused to reopen my case. I constantly question
why the U.S. government rushes to deport family-oriented men with no criminal records who have
continued to live in the United States as law-abiding citizens for numerous years.
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NSEERS continues to have real, negative impacts on families and communities.
Prosecutorial discretion “authorizes immigration officers and attorneys to channel their limited
enforcement resources towards the most dangerous, while placing sympathetic cases involving
individuals with favorable qualities like full-time fathers, those with serious medical conditions,
long-time employees, and students with strong ties to the U.S. on hold.”
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Prosecutorial discretion

could thus potentially apply to many individuals who are affected by NSEERS and present other
positive equities.
The October 2005 Memo by former ICE Principal Legal Advisor William Howard and the June
2011 Memo by ICE Director John Morton
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advise the use of prosecutorial discretion in ICE

enforcement, clarifying that the enforcement focus should be on high-priority cases. However, the
memos lack clear instructions about when and how to use prosecutorial discretion in NSEERS cases.
Arguably many of the positive equities that should be considered in the granting of relief, as
described in the Morton Memo, are demonstrated by several members of the Indonesian community
in New Jersey in which Reverend Kaper-Dale is so heavily engaged.
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These individuals, many of

whom had registered under NSEERS and none of whom have criminal histories, had overstayed their
visas. At least 37 were deported. In 2009 and 2010, most of these Indonesians who had not been
forced to leave were able to strike a temporary deal with the local ICE office but now face
deportation. They had received orders of supervision, allowing them to live and work in the United
States lawfully as long as they tried
to obtain legal immigration status.
In 2011, when the Morton Memo on
prosecutorial discretion was issued, the
community assumed that the memo
would aid their cases. Instead, ICE
seems to have stepped up their
enforcement, requiring 72 Indonesians,
who had previously been given orders
of supervision and who should qualify
for the favorable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, to report to

Photo Courtesy of Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale
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the local DHS office for possible immigration action.
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Prosecutorial discretion is critical to addressing the residual effects of NSEERS. The mere
existence of prosecutorial discretion guidelines, unfortunately, has not guaranteed their appropriate
implementation.
There are 19 bullet points [listing factors to consider when exercising prosecutorial discretion] in
Morton’s June 17th memo…and even if you have 17 on there, and if you don’t have the one or
two that your field office wants to give, they do not care. Everybody in our community has a large
number of those bullet points. Fifty-percent of our people have been granted 1 year stays by using
that criteria and fifty-percent [have] not. That’s how capricious this program is.
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--- Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale, Reformed Church of Highland Park, New Jersey

Lack of Transparency
Clear, publicly available information on NSEERS procedures and goals was unavailable from its
inception
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and the program continues to lack transparency. Even today, the agencies involved in

the program share little data and other information regarding its effectiveness. The few statistics that
are available, such as the frequently quoted numbers from a 2003 ICE factsheet on NSEERS,

are
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outdated. This factsheet states that, out of a total of 83,519 individuals who registered with NSEERS,
13,799 individuals were placed into removal proceedings and 2,870 were detained.
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The most

recently available information from the 2012 DHS OIG report states that the number of entry and exit
registrations decreased from over 250,000 per year in 2002 to approximately 60,000 in 2010. The
report further notes that “NSEERS remains a significant part of the CBP caseload” and that “at several
ports of entry, NSEERS registrants were the largest caseload handled in secondary inspections.”

118

There are various reports about the lack of information or even misinformation, particularly in
the beginning of NSEERS implementation. Voicing the perspectives of many immigration lawyers,
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Denyse Sabagh points out that very little information was available about NSEERS in its initial stages.
Even many immigration lawyers were unaware of the exact nature of the program and requirements
for compliance.
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The lack of transparency had grave effects on community leaders and affected

individuals, as further described by Dr. James Zogby.
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Profile
D r. J ames Z ogby,
P resident and F ounder
I nstitute

of the

A rab A merican

The Arab immigrant communities we serve at the Arab American Institute have been confronted with
the effects of NSEERS from the beginning of the program and continue to feel its consequences.
Right in the beginning, we called the Dallas office of the INS [in charge of NSEERS before the
creation of DHS] and asked, “Are you sending out notices of information to people?” and they said,
“Yeah it’s all taken care of.” We said that we have talked to our people in Dallas, but they have not
heard anything from you. INS responded and said “Oh no, that’s not true, we have talked to the
Arab community.” INS stated that they had a group of women in, and they had veils on so they knew
they were Arab. We then asked them what about the name of the group. It turned out that it was
some Pakistani medical association, so obviously the INS officer did not know that Pakistanis are not
Arabs and that not all Arabs are Muslims and just by [talking to someone] wearing a head scarf does
not mean that you talked to the Arab community.
We found much the same in other cities, where they did not know who the Arab groups were, they
did not know how to reach the groups, and they were counting on us. It was then that I began using
the framework that it was badly conceived, poorly executed, arbitrarily administered and it had
disastrous results. It was arbitrarily administered, which was what we discovered when they began
calling the dates because what we found was that if you were from the Clinton era and applied for
change of status and got married, whatever, changed schools, and got a letter saying okay, if you
showed up in one office, they said that you didn’t even need to show up and you were fine. But if
you showed up in another office you were told that it was not acceptable and you could be held for
deportation. We got a number of those.
Now, ten years after NSEERS was created, the lack of transparency is one of the major issues that
remain. My policy recommendation would be to request full transparency. I strongly believe that
without establishing transparency and accountability, the issues of the program will never be
addressed appropriately. That being said, I don’t see any willingness on the part of the government
to do that. When I asked a senior officer in DHS during the Bush administration to give us an
accounting of how many were ordered deported and why, he said that he couldn’t find such records.
That’s a hell of a way to run a government. You have people who came and registered at INS offices,
somebody must have a printout of that, someone must have some documentation of that. They say
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that they don’t. I would like to see how many people went in to register, and how many people were
deported and why. Until I see that, this entire process is a mystery and it’s a mystery because it is
so badly done and that is a huge embarrassment and the government does not want anyone to know
how badly it was done.
Even if NSEERS would actually be terminated at some point in the future, the issue of transparency
would have to be addressed. In fact, the Administration needs to re-examine the effects of the
program on individuals on a case-by-case basis. Practically no numbers are known or made available.
The decision makers responsible for the creation and enforcement of the program need to be held
accountable, particularly with the program’s infrastructure still being intact. We need to get to the
bottom of it. If the instinct is there and the culture is there, then this will happen again. NSEERS has
sowed fear and confusion in the Arab and Muslim communities instead of promoting an atmosphere
of cooperation with law enforcement authorities.
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S eth K aper-D ale ,
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Misuse of Data
The issue of transparency is closely related to concerns about data use. Even after the
discontinuation of the NSEERS requirements, it is not completely clear how the data collected through
the registration process has been and potentially still is being used. The “Operation Frontline”
program is one example of how data gathered through NSEERS was used for discriminatory law
enforcement activities that went far beyond the boundaries of NSEERS. Operation Frontline was
started in 2004 with the stated purpose of preventing a terrorist attack during the presidential
elections. To reach this goal, ICE targeted alleged violators of immigration law who had been
identified as potential national security concerns. While the government denied profiling based on
ethnicity or religion, more than 80 percent of the individuals approached through Operation
Frontline were from predominantly Muslim countries.
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Data from NSEERS and two other

immigration programs, the Student and Exchange Information System (SEVIS) and the United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT), were mined by ICE in order
to identify individuals to target for Operation Frontline.
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Advocacy organizations such as the

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee were quick to detect this misuse of the data.
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While NSEERS has been suspended, the data collected through the program is still available
to DHS and potentially other government agencies. Much of the data gathered is very private and
includes sensitive information, such that related to individuals’ private financial situations. Despite
the government’s claim that the data is being used for NSEERS purposes, those who registered have
to live with the constant fear that this data could be used against them in the future. This is all the
more troubling given the DHS Office of Inspector General’s acknowledgment that “the NSEERS
database is unreliable and it is difficult for NSEERS registrants to adhere to the registration
requirements.”
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The DHS OIG has further confirmed that “[D]ata captured in the NSEERS database

are transferred automatically to other DHS systems or captured initially in other systems, including
US-VISIT and Enforcement Case Tracking System (ENFORCE).”
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NSEERS is Easy to Resurrect
As mentioned previously, what was framed by DHS as the “end” of NSEERS was simply a
delisting of the 25 countries through the April 2011 Rule. The legal foundation for the program
remains. Subsequent to the April 2011 delisting, DHS itself admitted that the NSEERS program was
not dismantled because the government wished to keep the regulations intact:

Because the Secretary of Homeland Security’s authority under the NSEERS regulations
is broader than the manual information flow based on country designation that has now
ended, the underlying NSEERS regulation will remain in place in the event a special
127
registration program is again needed.

The decision by DHS to preserve the underlying NSEERS regulations is inconsistent with their
sentiment that NSEERS “has become redundant as we have strengthened security across the board,
while at the same time improving and expanding existing systems to automatically and more
effectively capture the same information that
was being manually collected via NSEERS.”
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Moreover, preserving the NSEERS framework
perpetuates the anxiety and fear felt in AMEMSA
communities. It also suggests that the federal
government condones discriminatory profiling
practices and intends to engage in them again
in the future. A significant step towards
establishing trust and eliminating profiling
based on religion, nationality, and gender
would thus be for the U.S. government to
terminate NSEERS completely. This would
require the full dismantling of the underlying
regulations and the provision of meaningful relief
for all individuals negatively impacted by the
program.

Photo Courtesy of Monami Maulik, Desis Rising
Up and Moving (DRUM)
30

Failure to Meet Program Objectives
NSEERS was inefficient and failed to meet the purpose the government claimed it served.
The program was purportedly designed as a counterterrorism tool. The exact number of
individuals arrested on the basis of terrorism-related charges through NSEERS has never been made
publicly available. In fact, there seems to be no evidence that NSEERS helped convict any individuals
in connection with any terrorism-related crimes, although the Bush Administration reported that the
program identified 11 “terrorism suspects.”
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Government officials have not corrected those who

have pointed out that “[NSEERS] was ineffective in producing terrorism-related convictions,”
that “the NSEERS program did not result in a single terrorism conviction.”
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or

Rather than refuting

these criticisms, DHS responded to a related congressional inquiry by stating that information about
the program’s success in convicting terrorists is classified and unavailable to the public.
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Another fundamental criticism of NSEERS is that the program is “unnecessary” because the
data collected through the program is already captured through other means.
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DHS even adopted

this view in its recent descriptions of the program, most notably in the April 2011 Rule.
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Moreover,

the 2012 report by the DHS OIG clearly stated that CBP itself has pointed to the low value of the
information collected through the NSEERS interviews.
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Given these failures and all the program’s

collateral consequences on families and communities, no argument can be made for DHS to keep the
program in its back pocket.

I think that it was an ill-advised program and the ultimate goal was not achieved because
the program was defective from the start… I would abolish NSEERS. There are plenty of
laws and regulations already in effect. If you are looking to come up with a program that is
trying to identify terrorists and prospective terrorists, then I would try to come up with a list
of characteristics that would be related to the actual focus of the search. 136
--- Denyse Sabagh, Head of Immigration Practice Group, Duane Morris LLP
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Postscript

Following the completion of this report, DHS released a long-awaited memo addressing the
treatment of individuals who previously failed to comply with NSEERS (April 2012 Memo).
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The April 2012 Memo offers the agency’s first definition for “willful” noncompliance with
NSEERS and protects individuals who are able to prove that their noncompliance with NSEERS was
not willful. It defines “willful” noncompliance as “that which was deliberate, voluntary, or intentional,
as distinguished from that which was involuntary, unintentional, or otherwise reasonably excusable.”
The April 2012 Memo further notes that individuals who are found to have “willfully” failed to register
can be considered for prosecutorial discretion as appropriate.
Importantly, the April 2012 memo is “binding” on all DHS personnel and requires each
component of DHS to implement guidance within 60 days and implement training in line with the
contents therein. Moreover, it retracts from the controversial language contained in the November
2011 USCIS NTA Memo by ceasing referrals of cases with suspected NSEERS violations from USCIS to
ICE unless the case is denied for “willful” noncompliance.
Despite the significant step DHS has made after years of documentation about the individuals
and families stained by NSEERS, the limitations of the April 2012 Memo are striking and illustrate the
importance of the recommendations contained in The NSEERS Effect. First and foremost, it maintains
the regulatory framework of the NSEERS program. Moreover, the April 2012 Memo fails to articulate
a clear policy for those who complied with NSEERS and now face immigration consequences.
Additionally, it creates room for ambiguity about what constitutes “willful” by leading with a rather
broad definition (see above) and later elucidating rather extreme examples (e.g., exceptional circumstances beyond the alien’s control, incapacitation of the alien). Also troubling is the conclusion that
people who failed to register out of ‘fear’ or ‘inconvenience’ could be found to be in ‘willful’
noncompliance. The April 2012 Memo further imposes the burden of proving that noncompliance with
NSEERS was not ‘willful’ on the individual while at the same time allowing the DHS to continue using
information that was obtained through or in connection with the NSEERS program.
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RWG is disappointed by the limited reach of the April 2012 Memo and hopes that this report and its
recommendations result in the full dismantling of the NSEERS program, redress for all individuals
impacted by the program, as well as a discontinuation of use of data collected through the program.
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Policy Recommendations
Refugees came to this country seeking safety from violence. They ended up having their families
ripped apart. Those that did not have their families ripped apart are going through 10 years of immigration hell because of NSEERS and the way it played out. You created anger and fear that we
have never gotten over. It still is doing damage.
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--- Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale, Reformed Church of Highland Park, New Jersey
•

Dismantle the Regulatory Framework of NSEERS: NSEERS has failed as a
counterterrorism policy. National security needs can be addressed more effectively and
efficiently through other existing programs and/or through programs targeting
individuals based on suspect behavior, not identity-based criteria such as race, religion,
gender or nationality.

•
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Remove Residual NSEERS Penalties: DHS should, by regulation, remove the residual
penalties associated with NSEERS, and apply such regulations retroactively. DHS should
additionally set aside immigration or criminal penalties against individuals who complied
with, did not comply with, or are otherwise affected by the NSEERS program. DHS
should also exercise prosecutorial discretion favorably in cases where an individual has
positive equities but faces immigration consequences because he or she was targeted
by NSEERS.

•

Information Collected through NSEERS Should No Longer be Used for Any Purposes:
DHS should discontinue the use of data collected through NSEERS.

•

Increase Oversight and Transparency: NSEERS should be fully audited by DHS through
the Office of Inspector General, as well as by the Government Accountability Office, to
determine the program’s effectiveness and to examine the continuing impact of NSEERS
on individuals and the potential misuse of data. DHS should also make statistics
available on the number of individuals who were identified through the program and
subsequently convicted of terrorism-related offenses. DHS also should provide
complete statistics about the total number of individuals who registered with the
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program, as well as details about the enforcement actions that were taken against
them.
•

Support the End Racial Profiling Act: To show his commitment to ending racial profiling,
President Obama should make a clear statement in support of the End Racial Profiling
Act (ERPA) of 2011.
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This bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress in 2011.

If ERPA were passed, it “would prohibit racial profiling by law enforcement at the
local, state and federal levels on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion,
and gender.”
•

141

Fix the DOJ Racial Profiling Guidance: To effectively combat racial profiling, the 2003
Department of Justice Guidance on the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies must be reformed to cover profiling based on religion and national origin;
remove the large loopholes that allow for profiling in the name of national security and
border security; cover law enforcement surveillance activities; apply anywhere federal
agents act in partnership with state or local law enforcement agents and to any agency
that receives federal funds; and make the guidance enforceable.
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